






























The general topic of practical reasoning is about whatever rational or conceptual methods are usable and defensible in our attempts to reach reasonable decisions as to what to do in real-world situations.  Presumably one cannot expect standard theories of rational behavior,  such as various utilitarian (U.) accounts of reasoning, to provide a fully adequate account of practical reasoning by themselves.1

For these theories are primarily about the behavior of ideal rational agents, free of various real-world constraints such as lack of knowledge or opportunity, and hence the theories would require some kind of appropriate application or adaptation before becoming part of practical reasoning. 

However, in the case of U. I shall show that there are fundamental problems which arise if one tries to satisfy minimum epistemic demands in applying or adapting U. to real cases.  These problems are serious enough to completely discredit U. as having any relevance to practical reasoning.


	WHY UTILITARIANISM SHOULD BE RELEVANT TO PRACTICAL REASON

First, why is it appropriate to even try to apply U. theory as a part of practical reasoning?  As a moral theory, U. claims that one ought to choose the action which has the best consequences, or highest overall utility. In this case the link between U. theory and practical reasoning is strong.  As with any normative conclusion of any moral theory, the conclusion is by its very nature a practical claim, derived from a chain of practical reasoning, that one ought to perform some real action (or some class of such actions) in some real-world situation (or class of such situations).   

Clearly in the case of a U. analysis, it is being claimed that one ought to perform that action which would be chosen by U. theory as having the greatest utility.  Practical reasoning then would involve a process in which one would acquire some appropriate knowledge of or information about the U. analysis, and put it to work in committing oneself to the appropriate action. 

Even if one thinks of U. as only a theory of rational choice, rather than as a moral theory, it seems inescapable that if one wants to act rationally, one ought (perhaps in a non-moral sense of 'ought') to choose the action recommended by U.  In other words, implications similar to those in the 'moral theory' case about practical reasoning follow.  One should find out whatever one needs to know about the U. analysis, and actually apply it in making a decision as to what to do.


	THE EPISTEMIC CONNECTION: WHAT INFORMATION IS NEEDED?

As the above rationale for why U. ought to be relevant to practical reasoning shows, a basic factor of concern is what might be called 'epistemic access' to an appropriate U. analysis of a situation.  Clearly U. will remain an 'ideal rational agent' theory for someone unless they have a way to access knowledge or information about the U. theory or utility calculations applying to a particular case, which information must itself be in some 'real-world' usable form so that it can actually function as part of their practical reasoning about what to do.  In this paper I shall concentrate on these 'epistemic access' issues, and ignore other possible problems for U. analyses in applying idealized models to real cases.
 
The standard 'pure' U. theory of rational choice between possible actions uses ideals of perfect or complete knowledge of sets of consequences and valuations for each such action, and of knowledge of resultant maximizations of such valuations which select that action or actions having the highest utility.  But if this ideal of knowledge is to have any use in practical reasoning, as we have seen, an applied form of U. must also provide us with some way to access at least some of this information. 

An appropriate initial question in any particular case would seem to be something like the following.  Do we need all, some, or none of this information? (The 'none' case is included for completeness, but we are already decided that U. would fail to support practical reasoning if 'none' is the answer.) 

But this question can be focussed more sharply, so that it itself is a question to be addressed by practical reasoning.  Clearly we need some principled way in which to apply U. abstract reasoning to actual cases of practical reasoning, and the discussion of how in general to apply U. theory is itself a topic within practical reasoning.  

Here is such a more 'focussed' form of the question, which brings out the analogy of the question to the original issue.  Rationally speaking, ought one to seek the maximum information possible about all of the alternative actions potentially available to one in a situation, or just some of the information, or none at all?  This is a more substantial and accurate version of the question than the initial question (what information does one need?) because it avoids the presupposition that it is only the minimal information necessary that one should be seeking.

Of the three possible kinds of answer to the question, all lead to grief for the U.  Here are three horns of the resulting trilemma (a three-pronged dilemma) for U.'s to worry over. 
 
Alternative one: if one ought indeed to seek that maximum information, it may often take the rest of one's life, or involve one in other exceedingly high knowledge-acquisition cost structures, if one is to acquire most or all of the information; costs which are so high as to completely negate or undermine the point of acquiring the information in the first place.  It most certainly is not rational to spend vast amounts of resources to discover information about the possible consequences of most possible actions one will consider.  So if this is the U. advice, it would not in most cases be the most rational or relevant advice.  Nor is it clear how this choice would constitute 'applying' (rather than abandoning) the U. theory in this case. 






Alternative three: use some rational method for deciding which amount of information would be best.  But as a U., trying to show how U. can be practical, how could one pick any method other than that of using U. standards to decide the question?  In other words, as a U. one should stick with the standard U. methods for evaluating all potential actions.  

So if the question is, whether rationally one ought to seek the maximum information possible about all of the alternative first-order actions potentially available to one in a first-order situation, or whether one should seek some other amount of information instead, then for the U., each of these alternatives should itself be evaluated as one potential second-order action among others which are possible in the second-order situation (namely, that of how much knowledge one should seek about the first-order situation).  As a result, there will be some perfect, ideal-knowledge second-order answer to the question which will serve to indicate the most preferable second-order action-choice among the alternatives. 

However, perhaps it is becoming clear that this fork of the trilemma is heading into serious regress problems.  Exactly similar questions about one's lack of knowledge can be raised about this second-order ideal-knowledge answer, assuming that one does not simply know what the best choice is.  Hence, unless we make hopelessly unrealistic assumptions about personal knowledge (that one just knows some results which normally would have very high knowledge-acquisition costs), the standard U. methods must founder in a potentially infinite regress of tasks.  Succinctly put, in order to know what to do, one has to know how much information one needs to know about what to do; but in order to know that, in turn one needs to know how much information about that second-order task one needs to know, and so on.     





	LEGITIMATE THEORY APPLICATION: A MODEL
	
In case there are suspicions of trickery at work here, let me give a simple model of applying theory, so we can see how everyday theories succeed through a parallel series of stages even as U. fails.  Suppose a paperback book has a good theory of income tax minimization.  One wishes to apply this in actually doing one's taxes. In order to do this, one has to apply the theory to the practical domain of one's own taxes.  

One's first question: how much information ought I to obtain about the theory in order to actually engage in practical reasoning to get my taxes done?   Answer: No more than can be obtained just by reading the book (this theory already is constructed with such practical applications in mind).  Hence one reads the book, then successfully does one's taxes--proof positive that the theory has successfully been applied.


	'INCREMENTAL' APPLICATION OF U. THEORY 

Here is a related problem about U. analyses, with a different starting-point.  Up to now, we have assumed that in some sense U. theory and calculations in a case exist independently of one's knowledge of them, and we have raised problems about how to judge how much knowledge one needs of them.  However, similar problems could be raised about applying U. theory 'from scratch' (that is, with no previous reservoir of worked-out potential actions and consequences) in a practical reasoning case.  These problems will imply either total chaos in epistemic access problems, or in the general case no controllable upper bound on epistemic access costs (which is just as deadly a failure to meet adequate practical reasoning criteria). 

When applying U. theory 'from scratch', the relevant epistemic questions concern not just the amount of information one wants, but also the costs of whatever kinds of knowledge-acquisition are needed during the attempt to develop an applied U. analysis of a case. 
  
First, an analogy showing the generally innocuous nature of including information costs in practical reasoning.  For example, the question of whether to use geiger counters in nuclear reactors is not simply a question about the potential benefits of doing so, because there are also definite 'information costs' associated with such monitoring, including the cost of the instruments, costs of training workers to use the instruments, etc.  Yet clearly, accepting the information costs in such a case does nothing to undermine the eminently practical status of the applied theory of detection of radioactive decay, which practicality is actually made possible through implementing the information costs in this way.

Now to the attempted construction of an applied U. theory.  A simple example will be helpful.  Suppose one wishes to determine what food store one should shop at, among those in a 15-mile radius from where one lives.  Normally a theoretical U. analysis of such a case would suggest that an ideal rational agent would pick the store having the lowest cost per item, or some similar claim.  

However, we wish to make the analysis practical in two ways, first by carrying it out 'from scratch' and proceeding incrementally (examining potential actions and working out consequences one at a time), and second by explicitly including knowledge-acquisition costs, or other related search and investigation costs, as part of the costs in the overall cost/benefit calculations related to each potential action.

Presumably in the example in question, each potential action is associated with choice of a different store to shop at.  The consequences include both the benefits and costs associated with choosing a given store, and we have specified that information costs should be included as debit items also.  So far, things look unproblematic, and U.'s may hope that the only difference from the theoretical, 'ideal-agent' U. is that applied U. is more expensive because of the extra knowledge-costs.

Unfortunately for U., deep trouble is at hand.  If the 'incremental' approach means that all relevant information about consequences has to be developed from scratch, with a full accounting of all costs incurred being part of the calculations of benefits and costs, then in effect one is searching completely in the dark.  One never knows whether any specific investigation will turn up a benefit, or a cost, or be so expensive in terms of the costs of information-gathering that any potential benefit would be completely swamped.  

Without general knowledge of stores, competitive advantages, long-term market trends etc., which by hypothesis must all be developed through empirical investigation, no effective practical reasoning is possible at all.  Hence U. cannot be made into a practical rational procedure by 'starting from scratch' and using purely incremental empirical methods. 

It gets worse for the U. position, though.  This initial criticism might be taken merely as a general problem about any purely empiricist approach to knowledge.  However, similar problems would apply to any incremental strategy for knowledge-acquisition, no matter what initial level of knowledge about a given domain in question is assumed.  The fundamental problem is that, no matter what one knows, one can never predict whether any particular search (for consequences going beyond what one already knows) will produce results which justify the costs incurred in discovering them.  

By its very nature, search assumes some level of ignorance of a domain, and the possibility of ruinously expensive searches with little to show for it is always present (ask any applied research director).  Any practical rational inquiry into any question, including that of which store one should shop at or any other topic of U. analysis, must be subject to cost constraints, in the following sense.  One must have full assurance, ahead of actually applying the practical procedure, that there is some reasonable upper bound on the costs that one would incur through application of the procedure.  But my point is that attempts to incrementally apply U. theory in a particular case could never provide any such guarantee of an acceptable upper bound on knowledge-acquisition costs.

Here is a brief example to show why this concern is a problem for the U. theorist.  Suppose one has the practical problem of deciding which house to buy.  A conventional, non-U. form of practical reasoning for doing this is as follows.  Hire a search firm, who will guarantee they will find you a house you will find acceptable for a fee specified in advance (which fee you also find acceptable).  Then accept their recommendation, and pay their fee.  This is merely to point out that of course, often the most rational way of making a practical decision is to hire some experts to do it for you at a known cost.  

But if one tried to make a similar decision by applying U. theory incrementally, who knows what it might cost?  A decision to try to apply U. theory incrementally in a particular case would be a complete gamble. Hence it could not be rational to try to apply U. incrementally in such cases.
  
Overall, then, given the practical failure of various 'incremental' approaches to application of U., we are thrown  back on the initial, 'ideal rational agent' interpretation of U. analyses, with all of their regress and other problems.


	PROBLEMS IN ADDING EPISTEMIC ACCESS TO U. THEORY

Here is another logical problem with U. analyses which try to take account of knowledge-acquisition costs.  This problem is not specifically about the application of U. theory, but rather it is about theoretical problems in U. itself which would result from trying to recognize knowledge-acquisition costs. 

Rather than looking at such knowledge-acquisition costs in terms of the amount or level at which one should incur them (which led to the regress noted earlier), we could instead try to think more theoretically of such costs as being directly associated in some way with the sets of consequences for each possible action. (For example, shopping at store X would have associated with its consequences the costs incurred in finding out what one needs to know about store X.)  

As long as we were using the incremental approach, it could seem harmless to think of knowledge costs as one more specific item in a list of consequences.  However, once we switch back to the more standard interpretation of U., we run into a severe problem of incomplete and partially circular definition for knowledge costs in relation to standard benefits and costs.  

The problem is this.  Until we had arrived at a final version of the set of consequences for a given action, with a definite utility associated with it, we could not accurately calculate a final version of the knowledge-acquisition costs associated with the set.  At the same time, we are unable to calculate a final version of the set of consequences (and its overall utility) until we have accurately calculated a final version of the knowledge-acquisition costs, since we have agreed that these costs do affect the overall utility of a set of consequences.  





The upshot of this discussion is that U. has shown itself to be entirely unfit for application in practical reasoning.  Theoretical extensions which would internally permit application of the theory turn out to produce logical confusion.  Basic questions about what one needs to know in order to apply a U. analysis embroil one in an infinite regress.  Attempts to use a very empirical, incremental application of U. either are no help at all (leaving one entirely 'in the dark'), or constitute arbitrary gambles which no practical reasoner could defend taking.   










	1.  David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) is a good source of utilitarian theories and views about practical reasoning.




